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Generally and ordinarily the law of real property i
extremely technical;

however, in studying the subject

under

consideration, it is to be observed that very frequently the
rules of reasonableness and intention prevail rather than
the niceties and rigid formulae of fixed laws.

The pur-

pose of this treatise is, briefly to trace the development historically of some of the principal rules of estates
upon condition and to point out

the several interpretations

of their fixed laws and of the more pliable ones of reasonableness and intention, interpretations often widely different and occasionally wholly irreconcilable.

Nothing of an

original character is claimed or will be attempted in this
effort,

save perhaps an occasional personal observation by

the writer upon some particular phase of the subject;anything else would be presumptuous.

Having extracted from

the various masters of the subject, both of the courts and
of the text-writers, some of the particular features and
characteristics of this highly interesting and eminently
practical branch of the law, and having to some extent sys-

tematically arranged the same, the writer will be pardoned
for any possible, and perhaps probable, shortcomings in
his efforts.
Freehold estates and those for years regularly
determine upon attaining their respective limits;

however,

conditions may be imposed by force of which they may be
determined without attaining their regular limits of duration, and at the same time without losing their distinctive
character.

Nor do these imposed conditions affect the

transrerability of such estates, for all conditional estates
are capable of being transferred in like manner as if estates in fee simple absolute.
2 Denio 336, the court
fee

say:

Thus, in Grant

v. Townsend,

"One seized of a determinable

( e.g. an estate in fee subject to be defeated by the

happening of an event upon which an executory devise is
limited), may convey the estate and the grantee will take
it accompanied by the same determinable quality which belonged to it in the hands of his grantor."

Washburn,(Vol.

I Ipage 6),says that the doctrine of estates upon condition
seems originally to have been derived from the feudal law,
and grew out
granted.
the

of the conditions upon which fiefs were

This statement is so frequently affirmed by all

authorities that

there can be no question as to its

accuracy.
But the condition may be connected with an estate

at will as well,(though to the contrary is
Prop.,I.,

p.

270);

Bingham,

Real

and the breach of the condition duly

taken advantage of by the reversioner,

on the occurrence

of the contingency, will determine the estate, as we shall
see later.

Thus where tenants in common allowed the plain-

tiff to use their premises gratis, "so long as he kept a
good school," the plaintiff being deficient and the defendants, the tenants in common, expelling him; the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held:

"this agreement gave the plain-

tife a tenancy at will with a conditional limitation, which
estate determines upon the happening of the contingency,towit:-the ceasing or failure to keep a good school by the
plaintiff."

Ashley v. Warner, et al., 11 Gray 43.

So also

where P. leased to C. certain premises at a fixed rent payevery second month, until P. could sell the premises for
a stated sum, upon the happening of which event the tenancy
was to determine; six months later P. sold and conveyed the
premises to R. with C.'s knowledge.
session, C. refused to surrender.
possession, it was held:

When R. demanded posIn a suit to recover

"The agreement to give up the pos-

session upon the sale of the premises, or to hold it until
a sale should be made,

operated as a contingent

limitation

of the term and when the contingency happened, the term
was at an end."

Clark v. Rhodes, 79 Ind. 342.
3

(Note:From

the terms of the lease as given in

the opinion,

the writer

submits that the tenancy was one from year to year, rather
than at will ).

Thus it will be observed that any estate

irrespcetive of its natural duration may be subjected

to

a condition.
Where an estate is given upon condition, the taking possession of the land to which the condition is annexed
binds him to a performance of the condition even if at
a loss.

So if an estate be made to an incapable person,

as to a married woman or an infant, and such person accepts)
he or she will be bound to perform the condition, because
it

does not charge that one's person but the land.
Likewise a testamentary gift may be upon condi-

tion, to create which no particular form of words need be
used, for if a corresponding purpose be read into the will
that purpose takes effect.

Schouler, Will, Sect.598.

The definition of an estate upon condition given
by Blackstone (4 Comm.152), is the one most commonly quoted,
and is probably the most accurate and comprehensive.

He

says:-"Estafes upon condition are such as have aruqualification annexed to them by which upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, the estate may either be
created or enlarged or defeated."

Substantially the same

definition is given by all others who attempt
4

to define

the term.

Thus in Larabee v. Carleton, 53 Me. 211, a con-

dition is defined as a "qualification or restriction annexed to a conveyance and so united with it in the deed as to
Obviously this is too narrow as

qualify or restrain it."
it excludes devises.

"An estate on condition expressed in
is

the grant or devise itself

where the estate granted has

a qualification annexed whereby the estate shall commence,
be enlarged or defeated, upon the performance or breach of
such qualification or condition."
196.

Wheeler v. Walker,2 Conn,

Schouler says that any qualification, restriction or

limitation annexed to a gift, and modifying or destroyinfessentially its full enjoyment and disposal, may be deemed
a condition.

Wigram, in his work on Wills,page 267, de-i

clares that a condition was a common law mode of defeating,
but not for transferring an estate.

"A condition such as

can determine an estate is a provision of a punitive character secured to the reversioner for the purpose of enabling him to enforce a specific performance by the tenant of
his duty to his landlord." Bingham,Real Prop.,l,p.276.
Generally speaking, a condition may be made of
almonst anything that is not illegal or unreasonable, on
the principle that the owner of the land, who is not obliged
to transfer it at all, may impose on its transfer such conditions or restrictions as he chooses and subject to which
the grantee takes the land, provided the conditions are not
5

in contravention oP any determined policy of the law.
An exception in a deed of conveyance is not

a

condition; but the land excepted must be used for the purpose specified, else the party using it is a trespasser.
Dygert v. Matthews, 11 Wend. 36; Thompson v. Gregory, 4
Johns. 81.
Conditions may be variously divided into conditions expressed or implied, precedent or subsequent, general
or special.
words;

Express conditions are those in deeds by actual

by implication of law they are conditions in law.

"Estates which men have upon condition in law are such estates which have a condition by the law to them annexed albeit that it

be not specified in

writing;

such conditions

as are intended by the law to be annexed to anything are
as strong as if the condition were put in writing.

Condi-

tions in law may be made even if there be no mention of such
a condition upon the estate made.

These latter are really

limitations usually' I Co. Litt. 222.
Express conditions are either general, putting
an absolute end to the tenancy on entry for breach;

or spec-

ial, merely authorizing the reversioner to enter upon the
land and take the profits to his own use and hold the land
by way of pledge untill the condition be fulfilled.
Law of Real Prop., p. 100.

McCall,

It is a tacit condition, (i.e..

a condition implied in law), of a grant of incorporation
that the grantees shall act according to the end or design
for which they were incorporated, and not beyond it;

thus,

an insurance company shall not carry on a general banking
business.

Peo. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 382.
Before taking up the considerations of conditions

precedent and subsequent, some attention will be given to a
brief discussion of the distinctions between conditions and
limitations, and conditions and conditional limitations. The
distinction in many cases is not always an obvious one; it
is however very necessary to distinguish them since their
several effects are essentially different.

Thus in Finlay

v. King's Lesse, reported in 3 Pet. 246, the Supreme Court
of the United States say: "The obscure and ambiguous language
of a will renders it in many cases very perplexing to tell
whether the testator meant the one sort of condition or the
other, if indeed he clearly apprehended the distinction at
all; no criterion is afforded by the choice of technical
expressions, but the probable intention of the testator
must determine the construction in every case of this kind.
Limitations operate of necessity by their own-lintrinsic force, whether precedently to create an estate or
subsequently to defeat it;

conditions strictly so-called

are the conditions of re-entry which render the estate defeasible by re-entry and do not necessarily defeatvit.
7

The

distinction in construction is said to lie in the terms
used; but it seems the distinction carrying with it so great
a difference in operation and effect, must depend upon the
intention and result rather than the exact letters of the
words.. As has just been seen, conditions annexed to estates
are sometimes so ambiguously drawn, especially when prepared
by unskilful hands, that it is difficult ofttimes to distinguish them.

Perhaps the only general rule in determining

whether words are words of a condition or limitation, is
that where they circumscribe the continuance of the estate
and mark the period which is to determine it, they are words
of limitation;

when they render the estate liable to be

defeated in case the event expressed should arise before the
determination of the estate, they are words of condition.
I Prest. Est. 129.

In other wordsthe limitation marks the

period which is to determine the estate; but the words of
condition render the estate liable to be defeated in the
intermediate time if the event expressed in the condition
happens before the regular determination of the estate. The
one specifies the furthest time the estate may continue and
the other marks some event whose occurence defeats the estate.

The difference between a condition and a limitation

is mainly in this:- a condition does not defeat the estate
until by entry by the grantor or his heirs, when the grantor
'78

is

in

of his

former estate;

whereas the mere happening of

the circumstance upon which the limitation depends determines the estate,

without the necessity of an entry or claim.

Miller v. Levy, 44 N. Y.
sec. 607,

489.

Oras is stated by Schouler,

"a devise or bequest is by way of limitation when

the estate or interest thereby is bounded or circumscribed
in time, so that it cannot last beyond the happening of a
stated contingency."

So also a difference is to be noted

in their respective effects: if the breach of condition be
relieved against in chancery,or be excused by becoming impossible by the act of God, the estate to which it is annexed remains unimpaired, if already vested, as will be
more fully shown hereafter; on the other hand, a limitation
determines an estate from whatever cause it arises: here the
estate is

not technically defeated,

but is

really determined.

Practically the same difficulty arises in distinguishing between a simple condition and a conditional limitation;

the latter

is

of a mixed nature,

partaking of the

characteristics of a condition and of a limitation; here
the condition is followed by a limitation over to a third
person in the event the condition remains unfulfilled or
there is a breach thereof: or as is much better and more cogently defined by our learned instructor in his class lectures:

"a conditional limitation is an estate draftia
9

as

upon condition with a remainder over, but construed as upon
limitation and giving the remainderman the estate upon the
termination of the preceding particular estate, instead of
requiring the original landlord or his heirs to enter and
t ien turn the estate over to the remainderman as would have
to be done if the condition were construed as a condition."
A conditional limitation is so far a limitation and is to
be distinguished from a conditionlthat upon the contingency
taking place, the estate passes to a stranger without entry,
contrary to the ordinary principle of law, tnat a stranger
cannot take advantage of a condition broken. 2 Kent, Comm.127
So that we may say a conditional limitation operates to determine the estate by the intrinsic force of the limitation,
for the event prescribed by the terms of the condition ends
the estate; on the other hand, a condition alone operates
by reserving a right of entry,

or rather of re-entry,

(or

in some cases it may be some other mode of defeating the estate), to the grantor and his heirs; here in the event prescribed the estate becomes defeasible by entry, but until
entrr

'ie estate continues.

An estate upon condition is

not void but voidable only by entry,or byclaim,uron the condition; and unless the right off avoidance is ex~rcised the
estate continues.

"A conditional limitation determining an

estate, leaves in the case of particular esta es tne next
vested remainder or reversion to take effect in

10

imnediate

possession.

A condition annexed

to an estate

with a

condi-

tional limitation woull be void and superfluous as regards
that

estate; and a remainder which is contingent at

time a conditional limitation takes effect,
LeakeLaw of Real Prop.

the

fails altogether."

Sometimes where the estate is in

terms an estate upon condition, it is construed into a conditional limitation where it is necessary to carry out
purposes and intent
We revert

the

of the grant.
now to the consideration of precedent

conditions and subsequent conditions,so-called.

"The dis-

tinction between these two classes of conditions is well
enough understood by the profession;

and still it

is not al-

ways easy,in practice, to determine with certainty whether
a condition was intended to limit the acquisition or the
retention of the estate."

II

Redf.,Wills,p.283.

ally speaking it is according to their effect

Gener-

in giving rise

to or determing an estate, that conditions are distinguished
as precedent

or subsequent.

A condition precedent may be

defined as one which must take place before the estate dependent

on it can vest or be enlarged;

while conditions

sub-

sequent are those which operate upon estates already created
and vested, or which do not prevent the vesting of the estate,

but may enlarge

created.

or defeat

th"em after

they have

been

However, conditiona precedent giving rise to full

ture estates, may operate indirectly as conditions subsequent

relatively

to the preceding, estate

by defe:,ting it;

the same limitation may be capable of being construed with
both aspects and may then determine the preceding estate;/
even though it

fail in effect to carry the estate over. Upon

the performance

of a condition precedent,

the grantee's

ti-

tle is complete without any further action by the grantor.
In

spite

of the general

rule that

"the law favors

the vesting of estates, and a condition annexed to an estate
is consequently presumed to be a subsequent one when not
clearly meant to be precedent,"

in all cases where the con-

dition is in the nature of a consideration for the concession,
its performance will be regarded as intended to precede the
vesting of any right, and so a condition precedent.
ditions precedent,,admit of no latitude;

Con-

they must be strict-

ly, literally and punctually performed. And a court of equity will never vest an estate when by reason of a condition
precedent it will not

vest in law:

such a court

cannot

lieve from the consequences of a condition precedent
formed.

Hence where the condition precedent

re-

unper-

consists of

several copulative terms; all must be performed before the estate vests, and auch an estate can never vest where the condition fails of performance for any cause.

So also, con-

ditions subsequent when relied on to work a forfeiture, must

be created by express terms or clear implication and are
construed strictly.

(See R. R. Co. v. Coburn, 91 Ind.557.)

In these latter, since they are in defeasance of interests
already vested, courts of law and of equity are strict in
requiring the very event

to happen or the act

with all

which is

its

particulars

to be done

to defeat the interest

previously vested.
Conditions precedent

do not affect the limitation

of an estate in respect of quantity or duration;

they relate

only to the time of the crmmencement of the estate.

Condi-

tions precedent giving rise to future estates occur in contingent remainders at common law, in limitations by way of
springing and shifting uses and in executory devises.

Con-

ditions subsequent may be annexed to future estates, vested
or contingent, operating upon estates in remainder and determining them even before'they vest in possession;

and so

also on contingent estates before they vest in interest.
"An estate

is

presumed to vest

er than at

a later date.

on the testator'

s death rath-

Hence if no intention to defer

the period of vesting definitely appears, while a definite
date for performing th7 condition after the testator's death,
appears, or if there appears a vesting as usual though on
probation,

a condition subsequent

may be inferred;

rather than precedent

but the preferable

condition precedent

inference is

that

of a

where the vesting appears deferred to
13

some definite date after the will comes into operation, especially if by some prompt

the condition

or decisive act,

Schouler on

may be performed or its alternative solved."
Wills,

sect.,599.
We have already observed that

cedent

if a condition pre-

fails of performance for any cause, the dependent

estate does not

vest;

on the other hand, if the condition

subsequent becomes impossible of performance, the effect is
not to defeat the estate dependent upon it,

but

that

con-

tinues having once vested, the same as if no condition had
This is univ-rsally laid down by the courts

been attached.

Thus a devise to A. if she continued

and text-writers.

unmarried, but if she married with the consent

of certain

persons she could have the estate as if she remained unmarried, was construed to be a life estate, subject to the condit'ion subsequent
the lifetime

determining

the estate

of the persons named,

if

without

she married in
their

consent;

this condition being rendered impossible by the death of
those persons and the estate for life became absolute.
is an early English case reported in 3 Madd. 256,
uniformly followed.

It

This

and has been

is also a general rule that where

a testator, subsequent to the making of his will, himself
renders impossible a condition whereon a devise depends, the
devise will
dition.

b-

held to be absolute

irrespective

of the con-

It is a fundamental rule that all conditions which
are in their nature or object illegal, are void and inoperative,,a rule to which there are no exceptions.

The only

question involved is whether the condition imposed is really
illegal; if it is, it is altogether void.

Conditions to

omit a positive duty, to aid or encourage crimes, forbidden
by statute or some rule of the common law, are void per se.
Where the illegality of a condition precedent does not concern anything 'malum in se' but is merely against a rule or
the policy of law, the condition only is void;

for the con-

dition not being lawful, it is held in the phrase of the
Civil Law 'pro non adjecta.'

Thus conditions annexed to a

gift the tendency of which is

to induce husband and wife to

live separate, or be divorced, are upon grounds of public
policy and morality void.
There is a species of illegal conditions termed
'repugnant,' so called from their inconsistency with the interests of those upon whom estates are bestowed; e.g.,

from

the imposition of restraints incompatible with the enjoyment
of their respective estates in so large and ample a manner
as the la.w allows when dispositions are so made.

An exam-

ple of this is where a condition is annexed to the gift of
an estate tail
dition

that the donee shall rot marry;

here the con-

is void ror without marriage he cannot have an heir

to his
further

body.

This part. of the subject

when treatirny

of

'restraints

will be dealt

upon alienrtion,

with
'later.

There a condition is possible at the time of making it

and afterwards

becomes impossible of performance

either by act of God or of the law or of tfie grantor,(as
examples given ante),

in

or if the condition be impossible at

the time of making it,

the estate

of the grantee

being once
Mc.

vested, is not thereby divested but becomes absolute.
Lachlan v. McLachlen, 9 Paige 534.

Where a literal perform-

ance of a condition subsequent becomes impossible by the
happening of some event

subsequent to the vesting of the

estate, the condition must then

be performed as near the

intent of the testator as is possible.

But a condition is

not regarded as impossible simply because it is beyond the
power of the grantee or devisee to perform it;
so when it

becomes impossible of performance.

tion is so expressed that

it is only
If' a condi-

it is impossible to ascertain

with certainty the event or contingency upon which the estate is to arise or be defeated, it is equivalent
impossible and is equally inoperative.

to being

Under this head

of impossible conditions may be enumerated these:-

where the

testator through ignorance has required acts to be done
that have already been performed.,
have taken place;
sible,

or events to happen which

in such cases as the conditions are impos-

thie beneficiaries under a

will take their

interests

unqualified by such conditions.

pure an

See Roper, Law of

Legacies, pp. 754-757.
So that

mr-y be said that the same

it

whether the condition be

or impossible at

illegal

or whether it

of limiting the estate,

rules apply

and if the condition precedent

becomes

the time

so afterwards;

be illegal or impossible,
are void;

both the condition and tne estate

if

such condi-

whether as a conditional limitation or

tion be subsequent,

as a condition of re)entry, the condition alone is void and
the estate

good and absolute.
With reference to no other phase of our subject
seem so hopelessly at

do the authorities

variance

as in

views towards conditions in restraint of marriage.

their

This

irreconcilable diversity has long existedand has now resolved
into the several branches

practically

itself
partial

restraints;

widows;

and 3,

2,

against

restraints

the remarriage

restraints of marriage unless with the

of specified persons.

and

of:-l,total

of

consent

There are of course minor discus-

sions, hinging mainly upon the reasonableness of conditions
in

partial

restraint

of marriage

but

the divisions given

ones, and these will be treated

above are the more important
in the order named.

1. Where a gift was made to a woman for life with
a gift

over if

she marriei,

it

was held that

the condition

operating in restraint of marriage was illegal and a gift
over was void and consequently the prior gift
solute notwithstanding marriage;

remained ab-

for in such case there is

nothing to give an interest beyond the marriage;(citing
Hare,570).

Leake on Real Prop.,p.--

2

In Williams v. Cowden,

13 Mo. 211, we find that a general condition in restraint
of marriage is not good when attached to the estate of a
daughter .

There the court says:-"Upon the general propo-

sition, the preservation of domestic happiness, the security
of private virtue and the rearing of families in habits of
sound morality and filial obedience and reverence, are to
be deemed objects too important to society to be weighed in
the scale against individual or personal will.

In this case

it need scarcely be more specifically intimated, that the
clause in question, however well intended, virtually presented and hell up a continued reward for that species of
immorality to avert which the institution of marriage was
so divinely ordained and has been so wisely upheld."

These

instances serve to illustrate the rule now generally observed that under ordinary circumstances a condition in general
restraint of marriage whether in a grant od devise will be
wholly void.
But a partial restraint upon marriage is not void,
supposing of course all such conditions are bona fide, that

compliance or non-compliance therewith is, from the nature
of things, practicable and that nothing irrational, no covert
restraint

or prohibition, no violation of policy in other

respects, is involved in a gift so qualified.

To render a

condition in restraint of marriage void, it must be in fact
general, or at least unreasonable and a condition that a
person shall not marry before attaining a certain age, provided the age fixed be not unreasonable, is a good condition.
It has been nowhere held or pretended, that an absolute prohibition of marriage until twenty-one years of age is not
reasonable and lawful, anl must not be upheld as a good condition, the violation of which may defeat a vested estate.
Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ills. 212.

It may be laid down as

a general rule that one w'io has an interest in the future
marriage and settlement of the person in life, may annex
any reasonable condition to the bequest of property to such
person even though it may operate to delao or restrict the
formation of the marriage relation.

But where the restraint

though in form partial, renders marriage practically impossible or very difficult, then the condition imposing it is
invalid.

Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Gratt.804.
The greatest diversity of opinion prevails as to

a husband's imposing a complete restriction on his widow's
remarriage.

On the one hand upholding the doctrine that

a husband may impose such restrictions, is Scholuer, who
makes the broad and unqualified assertion that a condition
that a widow shall not
valid.

remarry is universally upheld as

It is true he does not cite many American autiori-

ties in support

of his assertion.

However such a restric-

tion has been held valid in some jurisdictions, notably
Pennsylvania and Illinois.
It

seems to be settled that devises of real estate

upon condition in restraint
sylvania.

of marriage are valid in Penn-

"If authority can settle anything in this state,

it must be taken as the settled law of the state that in a
devise of realty coupled with a condition in restraint if
future marriage, effect will be given to the condition by
making the breach of it

work a forfeiture, whether thereis

a limitation over to another in that
v. Lovell, 35 Pa. St.

event or not."

Cornell

105.

So in Illinois we find the doctrine enunciated that
"a testator may impose reasonable and prudent restraints
upon the marriage of the objects of his bounty, by means of
conditions precedent or subsequent, or by limitations;

while

he may not, with one single exception, impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of his bounty, by means oc conditions
or limitations;

that exception is in the case of a husband

in making bequests or legacies to his own wife;

he may right-

fully impose the condition of forfeiture upnn her subsequent
marriage.

The reason of this exception is the regard to
rathe'-

the family of the testator,

than any miorbid sensi-

bility or jealousy toward one who might

come after

him."

Shackelford v. Hall, supra.
"There seem no impropriety however in allowing the
operation of conditions

in

restraint

of the marriage

of

widows in favor of such persons as may have a reasonable
interest, pecuniary or moral, in the question of their
riage."

mar-

Redf,,Wills,I1,p.298.
To the same effect

we find in Sharswood & Wait's

American Real Property,page 129:-"Pt now seems well settled
that a condition in restraint

of a second marriage contain-

ed in a devise by the husband of the devisee will be upheld
and this in spite of the position taken by some judges and
eloquently urged by counsel that the policy of the law is
opposed to any restriction upon the legitimate increase of
population, and that

restraints upon second marriage are

odious to the common law and to public policy as being the
invention of ecclesiastics to whom such marriages were distasteful."
In

an earlier

Pennsylvania case,

monwealth v. Staufferl0 Pa. St.

that

oP the Com-

350, ChiefJustice Gibson,

overruling the opinion of the court below, said, rather fa-

"I

cetiously:-

know of no policy on which such a point could

be rested, except

the policy which for the sake of a divi-

sion of labor would make one
gotten by another.

It would be extremely difficult to say

why a husband should
to his wife without

man maintain the children be-

not be at

liberty to leave a homestead

being compelled to let her share it

a successor to his bed, and to use it

as a nest

with

to hatch a

brood of strangers to his blood."
There is considerable authority and reason, however,
on the other side of the
are invalid.

Thus in

question;i.e.,that
the

early

reported in 6 Pa.Law Jour.231, it

such restraints
case of Middleton v.Rice,

is said;1"The idea that

a condition that a widow shall not marry is not
seems to have been taken from the civil law, or

unlawful
rather from

the canon law, which made conditions against marriage void,
as to virgins but allowed them as to widows, especially if
imposed by a husband on his own wife.

Such a distinction

may have existed at Rome and have proceeded from a selfish
pride or ungenerous prejudice on the part

of husbands or

ecclesiastics who were most likely the lawgivers there.
the credit

To

of English lawgivers, it never entered into their

minds to make any distinction of this sort,

for certainly

it does not appear to be sustained by any principle of nature or sound policy.,

Why should a widow of twenty-two be

restrained from marrying any more than if she had never married?

The condition is void because it puts a restraint

on marriage which ought not to be discouraged."
The question is regulated in Indiana by legislative enactment;

section 2567 of the Revised Statutes of that

State provides that "a devise or bequest to a wife, with a
condition in restraint of marriage, shall stand, but the
condition shall be void."

But where a testator devises land

to his wife "so long as she shall remain my widow,"thw court
said its "conclusion necessarily is, that the words used in
the devise in this case were words of limitation merely,
and not of condition in restraint of marriage and that in
consequence the estate which the widow,(who never remarried)
took in the lands devised to her will not extend beyond the
expiration of her term of widowhood;" and consequently a purchaser from her does not get a fee simple, but only an estate
during her widowhood.
Other than the authorities mentioned in support
of the doctrine favoring such restraints on the remarriage
of widows, we are unable to discover any recognized judicial
authority which upholds that doctrine.

Reason is certainly

strongly in favor of the other view, as

well as public pol-

icy.

Otherwise the disposition to repose confidence in

one's widow after one's death will be thwarted, at least certainly not encouraged.

Moreover the wife is frequently as
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much entitled to credit in the accumulation of the estate
as the husband, and she should be allowed to exercise this
righteous privilege of enjoying it after the husband's decease.

Ample provision relatively can easily be made for

such as are dependent

on the bounty of the testator, without

imposing any such severe and unreasonable restrictions on
his widow.

While it does not necessarily follow that

subsequent life and conduct

the

of a widow will be any the less

virtuous as a consequence of such a restriction, it most
assuredly is the better, more humane, more generous and more
natural, to leave her free from any such restrictions.

We

much prefer the latter view, as being the more reasonable,
politic and enlightened.
3. The preliminary requirement of marriage with
consent at any time,
lent

bting neither a general nor a fraudu-

restraint upon marriage, as such conditions are not

void by the civil law, there appears to be no reason why
they should not be so by our law.

"A condition generally

not

to marry without

obtained and that volun-

tarily,

where ther

consent, first

is

a gift

donee marrying without

over in

such consent,

a very great number of cases."
Where the consent
must

the event bf the first
fas been held valid in

(See Jarman,Wills,40,note b).

of more than one person is required, all

concur and that

of a majority will not

be sufficient.

Where all or any of the persons whose consent is required
decease, this naturally renders it impossible to procure such
consent and is the same as if the condition had become impossible, with the result

,e have seen before.

When

the

consent of executors or trustees, or the major number of
them, is required to the marrying of donees, it must be obtained before gr at the time of the marriages.

So also the

confidence reposed in individuals by testators, whetner relatives or strangers, to decide upon the propriety of the marriages of their children, is a personal trust and must thereAbsolute con-

fore be strictly pursued in the performance.

sent once given cannot be retracted upon any consideration
which does not affect the propriety of having granted such
consent in the first instance.

The reason

seems to be that

the parties are considered to have acted upon the license,
and it would be doing violence to their feelings, as well as
to the intention of the testator, to permit the consent to
be countermanded for any reason which did not prove the assent ought not to have been given originally.

Mere caprice

should not be allowed to alternate between giving and with
drawing consents.

But a consent obtained by fraud or imposition

will not of course, be considered a compliance with the condition imposed.

Moreover consent to marriage may be given

conditionally and the vesting of the estate will depend upon
25

the performancer:or non-performance of this condition upon a
Consent to the marriage of a legatee or devisee

condition.

will be considered well given and t,e condition complied
with, if such beneficiary marry with the approbation of the
testator in his lifetime, though in words tcie testator
has only spoken of a marriage to take place after his death.
Ro also in a condition to marry with tae consent of some
specified person, or or an alternative condition, the performance of either part vests the estate.
A mere wish that a devisee should not marry without doing a particular thing, does not constitute or create
Thus the clause that

a condition.

'my wife shall never

marry without securing the propertyfor the benefit of her
and her children, is my desire;'

was held not to affect the

provision in favor of the wife 'for and during her natural
life,

so as to reduce her interest upon her marriage.

Ray-

field v. Gaines, 17 Gratt.l.
Tucker, in his Manual of Wills, page b2, says:
"There are few cases in this Commonwealth (Mass.) upon conditions in

estrainl

of marriage.

As a rule it is safer

not to make tne gift dependent upon an absolute condition
but to limit it over to another upon the marriage of the
first taker.""

This good advice may well be followed in

all states in which this question as yet remains ansettled.
The question as to what

conditions ;.ffecting mar-

riage are valid must

depend upon the circumstances of each
by the

case and will be very materially affectel

particular

consideration how far

the condition was one fairly

ble to the relations of the parties

applica-

and the peculiar views

and situation of the donor and the donee.
Further on this general aspect of these conditions
we find in Roper's Law of Legacies,

volume Ipp. 758,et

seq-:

"That a restraint upon marriage may be judicious and proper,
admits of no

doubt, and its total rejection by the Oivil

Law as at first

established appears to have been founded on

no general principle but upon the particular circumstances
of the Roman empire at that time.
depopulation occasioned by it

After the ('ivil War, the

led to the habits of celibacy.

In the reign of Augustus the Julian law not only offered encouragement

to marriage but laid heavy penalties and impo-

sitions upon celibacy.

The rule being thus established for

the encouragement of marriage it followed that no person
could impose restraints directly contrary to the law.

Hence

it became a rule of construction that these restrictive:conditions were void;

a rule certainly inapplicable to a coun-

try where there is no law to restrain individuals from exercising their own diseretion as to the time and circumstances
of the marriages

which their

bounty may contract.sition

that a testator

-

children or the objects

of their

- The unreasonableness of the suppodid not mean what he expressed,
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com-

the law of this cointry

bined witn ti-,e consideration that

in policy, restrain the imposition of judicious

did not,

restraints upon marriage, has at

last

ions fixed the law upon this subject
rule of the rnivil Law;

amid conflicting opinagreeably to the correct

and it is now settled that although a

general restriction against marriage is void, yet conditions
imposing particular restraints upon marriage in testamentary
dispositions of property are legal and bind."
"fenerally speaking all such conditions which are
unreasonable, either on account of the donor having no recognized rights to interest himself in t~ie marriage of the donee,
or becaust he goes beyond the jikst
does exist

limits of a right

which

to a certain extent, or, because he attempts to

exercise his control in an improper manner or to an improper
extent,

are void.

Beyond this, the determination of the

question rest in the mere'judgment
cumstances of each particular case.

of the court upon the cirIf the condition or

limitation of the bequest over is made to depend upon the
marriage of the female devisee, in such form as to indicate
the leading purpose in the testator to discourage har marriage, it

will be held void as against public policy;

but if

the estate is passed over to others upon the marriage of the
first devisee, apparently because such person will more need
the aid therefrom arising than the first devisee after mar
28

riag,

, or foo any other

bona fide purpose,

aside

!'rom the

hindering or discoiraging of tv-e rar'iage of the first

de-

visee, the condition will be held legral, and the estate pass
over upon the marriage of such devisee." Redf.,Will,II.,29 8 .
An estate for life may be limited to determine on
alienation, b.t conditions in restraint of alienation cannot
be annexed to an estate in fee; being repugnant to an insepa

arable incident o ' tle estate they are wholly void. "If
feoffment

be made upon this condition,

that tie feoffee shall

not alien the land to any, this condition is void, because
when a man is enfeoffed of lands or tenaments, he hath power
to alien them to any person by the law.

For if such a con-

dition should be good, then the condition should oust him of
all the power which the law gives him, which should be against reason and therefore such a condition is voide.

So
It

it is Of any conveyance whereby a fee simple doth pass.

is absurd and repugnant to reason that he that hath no possibility

to have tne land reve,-t to him,

shall restrain his

feoffee in fee simple of all his power to alien, being

.gainst

the height and puritie of a fee simple." I Co. Litt. 223. A
condition annexed to an estate purporting to dispose of it
in case of intestacy is repugnant to an absolute interest
and void; so also a condition thiat the tenant shall not take
the profits of thie land;
ever at a definite rent.

or that the land shall be let for-

At the common law it

was a condition in law annexed

to the estate of a tenant for lLfe
particular estate,
g.

that if

or for years or any other

he made a tortious alienation,(e.

conveyei a greater interest than was really his,)

such

alienation worked a forfeiture of his estate and the reversioner or remainderman might enter as for a breach of condition;

but conveyances have no longer any tortious opera-

tion an. the grantee in such case will take only to the extent of the tenant's actual interest,

without giving the re-

versioner or remainderman any such right of re-entry.
A devise to three children on condition not to sell
or convey to any one except one of the devisees, vests an
estate in fee and the condition is void. Schemerhorn v. I4egus
1 Denio 448.

But on the other hand a condition that no

sale of the property conveyed shall be made without first
giving the grantor and his heirs an opportunity to purchase
it has been sustained in Jackson v. Schutz,18 Johns. 174.
A restriction against aliening except

to one or

more persons, or after the lapse of a certain number of years,
or the occurrence of a particular event, being provisions in
favod of particular persons, are in the nature of trusts in
favor of such persons and being capable of creation, beyond
all question, by the use of proper terms, the inclination of
the courts is to give them effect according to the evident
intention of the testator.

However where a devise was made

in

fee with a

restriction

twenty-five years

alienation in

against

less

the condi-

from the death of the testator,

tion was held void as violating the rule against
ties.

Oxley v. Lane,35 14.

than

perpetui-

Y. 347.

A general restraint of alienation includes as well
a disposition by act
specific

of law,e.g.,

by bankruptcy, as by the

of the person prohibited.

act

Roper, Legacies.

Though an estate for life may be limited to determine upon
charging or attempting to charge the estate, or upon the
grantee's bankruptcy or insolvency. LeakeLaw of Real Prop.
Conditions in partial restraint of alienation are not favored
in law but are construed strictly in favor of the lessee and
are therefore hald applicable only to the first lessee and
not

to his assignees.
The following limitations or conditions on fees

have been held valid in T ew York: on condition that the grantee shall not at
liquors,etc.,

any time manufacture or sell intoxicating

on the premises,Plumd v.

Tubbs,41 N.Y.442;

in

this opinion it is said:-"These views,(i.e. enhancing the
value of his property, bringing thither a more refined society,&c.-

of the grantor cannot

and absurd;

be pronounced unreasonable

the grantor had The right to hold them and he

had a right to use his property in a manner that would accomplish them; "

on condition treat the grantee should support

the grantors,Spalding v. Hallenback,35 id.204;
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on condition

that the grantee is

not to build on the land under penalty

of forfeiture,Gibert

v.

Peteler,38 id.165;

a grant or dedi-

cation to a public corporation of land on condition that it
be applied to, and used as, a publi square,

Mayor v. Stuy-

vesant,17 id.34; a devise to a person until Gloversville
shall be incorporated as a village, Leonard v.Burr,18 id.96;
In the case of Plumb v. Tubbs,supra, the court approved those
cases wherein conditions against the use of the premises for
a schoolhouse, distillery, blast furnace, livery stable, machine shop, powder magazine, hospital, and cemetery, had
been upheld as valid.

The condition in a grant to an organ-

zation or society that a church erected, or to be erected, by
it on the premises granted shall remain a free church, has
also been sustained. Woodworth v. Payne,74 N.Y. 196.
Various gifts are made conditional upon the maintenance or education of others specified in a grant or will,
and such conditions are always upheld as legitimate and valid.
Leading cases of this sort will be found in Smith v. Jewett,
40 N.H. 530; Brigham v. Shattuck, 10 Pick. 306; Hogeboom v.
Hall,34 Wend. 146; Lindsey v. Lindsey,45 Ind.552;
Smith's Estate,- 41 Mich.

Calkins v.

409.

Many other conditions, clear of meaning, are upheld
as violating no rule of policy;

among them, a condition that

a person named shall be reared in a prescribed faith, Magee
v. Apperson,19 S.C.,170,(in this case the Catholic faith);
32

on condition to defeat a pending lawsuit
tor;

Cannon v.

O'Neill,14 Lea 553;

that

against
the parties

the testabenefited.

by the devise shall become and remain r~conciledto each other,
14 Bush 205.
In
providing
supra),

connection with the statement

for the support

that a

condition

of the grantor will be valid (

it may be remarked. that it

seems tnat

ut

such a condi-

tion partakes of a personal character and that the conveyance of the estate will not

shift the obligation to the sub-

sequent grantee to perform the condition;

it still remains

with the original grantee. Barker v. Cobb,3i

".H.

344.

We have seen that a will which purports to vest in
a devisee or legatee either real or personal property or the
income of such property and secure to him its enjoyment free
from liability for his debts, is void;

and this on grounds

of public policy, not to add repugnancy, as being in fraud
of the rights

of creditors;

or in

o'her

words because

it

takes away another of the incidents of property as essential
as the right to dispose of it.

(qee 91 U.q.716).

gowever a

gift of the income of property, real or personal, to cease
on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the devisee is good, being
a mere limitation.

Oampbell v. Foster,35 V.Y.361.

Where a father revoked a provision in his will nn
condition that his daughter became a nun, it was held a valid

and legal condition, and that the provision ceased on her

becoming a nun although there was no bequest over.
All clauses or provisiond not to dispute one's
will under penalty of forfeiture should at least be construed as strictly as possible, being penal in their character
and operation.

In some states the bona fide inquiry wheth-

er a will was procured through fraud or undue influence is
not to be stifled by any provision or prohibition contained
in the instrument itself.
399

'2ckson v

westerfield,

6l

Tow.Pr

nut in otner states such conditions have recently

been pronounced valid, both as to real and personal property.
T'onegan v.Wade,70 Ala.501; 7radford v. Pradford, 19 Oh. t.546
An this score Redfield says'"in this country any condition
which is reasonable as one against disputing one's will
surely is since nothing can be more in conformity to good
policy than to prevent litigation, will be upheld as binding
and valid."(Taw of Wills,p

.)

At comnon law an estate in fee simple mi~-it be
determin-d b:7 a conditional limitation so that upon the happening of - certain event the estate ceasedthus an estate
to A. and to the (male) heirs of his body
ple in quality;

,

was a fee sim-

but as to quantity or duration it was deter-

minable by failure of (male) issue.

Such limitations were

converted by the Statute De Donis into fees tail; but where
the statute did not apply such limitations, unless there
34

were a special custom extant,
T\To

simple conditional.

were construel to give a fee

such limitation cocld be made of

free-hold, lands after the Statute Quia Emptores, which prevented the creation of any seignory to which an escheat

of

the fee, upon the determination of the estate could attach;
fee simple estates

so that now all

conditional limitations;

of

spite

are absolute in

and this on the theory that where

absolute property is once given to an individual, it

cannot

be subjected during his life to a condition, that if he do
or dispose of it,

not use it

ditions expressed in a grant
grantor end his heirs,

v.

T.

An

shall cease and

A right of entry upon positive con-

go over to another.

Fmptores,

his interest

,

of fue may be reserved

notwilhstanding
2 1.

& Ald.

the

Otatute of Ouia

168.

series of cases was that

interesting

to the

involving

the alleged manor of Penssalaerwyck, a very large estate on
- rior to 1852, it was conceded that tne self-

the Hudson.

styled lord of the manor was really a feudal one, and the
owner in reversion of whom those holding in fee were tenants;
hence the condition imposed,(in this case the payTment
tain rents),

operated according to the coinmon law.

a long contest,
" ichael,6

n'.Y.

of cerTut after

the court finally decidedin TNePeyster vs.
467,

that

there was no reversion le.ft

in

the

owner in whose favor the condition of re-entry was reserved,

and that

the so-called tknant

in

This

fee held absolutely.

doctrine was endorsed in l'anRenssalaer v. Ways, 19

Y

95,
It

and has ever since been heldi to be the correct one.

seems that all the states have adopted this rule, with possibly the exception of Pennsfrlvania
"Out
many cases,

of tavor to the devisee of lands,

especially the older ones,

insisting

taere

are

very strong-

ly upon the controlling force of technical words importing
a fee, so as to discard peremptorily whatever words of qualification may follow, on the theory tnat

a repugnant

condi-

tion is attempted, which in consequence must be utterly void.
onceding that a restraint upon alienation is per se
nant

to an estate

in

does not follow that
ed or repugnant;

fee or absolute gift

repug-

of any kind,

it

such a condition must always be reject-

for tae context may show that

this restric-

tion or qualification was of the very essence of the devise
or bequest, and that no fee, nor absolute gift,
plated at all, but a qualified gift,
to the law or public policy."

was contem-

obnoxious in no respect

'chouler,wills,sect.6 1

"If the conditions are subsequent, a failure to
perform the conditions may be followud by a
the estate of (the grantee),

Porfeiture of

even if it be a fee simple."

91

Ind. 557, R.R.no. v. Coburn.
It

is

a general principle

of construction that

con-

ditions
in

are not

favored,

terms importing

i.e.,

that

limitations

of estates

The rule is

in favor of vested and ondefeasible estates.
are to be

that conditions annextid to an estate

could not

at

common law be limited on a

perhaps the reason why the courts
ditions as subsequent
tions subsequent

rather

are not

beneficially
interest.
123 "ass.

construed

is

con-

However condi-

law because

they tend to

strictly,

possible the vested

nonrad v. Long,33 "ich. 78;
584;

this

incline to construe

favored in

so as to save if

contingency,

than precedent.

destroy estates and are therefore

as

construed

as the immediate freehold

rather than precedent;

subsequent

generally

conditions are to be construed,

and
estate

or

Parker v. Parker,

"rane v. Hyde, 135 -'ass. 149.

The pendency of ttie conditions depends on the order
of time in
formance.

which the intent
As to the

of the transaction

forms of conditions it

requires
is

clear

cannot depend upon the particular phraseology, but
upon the general intent as expressed in the grant
In all cases where the

per-

they
entirely

or will.

intention can be collected thlat the

devise should be conditional and the terms are so definite
as to admit of execution, such intent

being legal will be

effectuated by whatever words expressed.

But

a condition

will not be readily raised or enlarged by construction.
Jennings v.

O'Brien,

47 Iowa 392,

a

father

made a

In

conveyance

to his son on condition that the son should not alien during
the father's lifetime;

it was held that there was no condi-

tion to support the father during life.
If a covenant be followed by a clause
is broken, it

ure and it

ent

will be construed as a condition;
So where a will imports a pres-

v. Pitts, 53 "T.Y. 85.

'oore

the, devisee

in

interest

of forfeit-

it

is

to be construed

so that

any condition in the same shall be held subsequent and not
Bell v. Alexander,22 Tex. 350

precedent.

A condition precedent,

impossible eitlier in its

creation or under the existing circumstances, or illegal,
carries down with it the devise whose vesting depended upon
it,

even though-

and this

blame;

strict

construction here avails but

not declare that
tion

precedent
"Still

the devisee himself be without
little if it

the will really imposed no distinct

can-

condi-

at all.
carrying out

the general desire of the law

to declare remainders vested, words of seeming condition will
if possible be hell to have the effect of postponing the time
of possession merely and if clearly conditional will be interpreted, so far as the context will permit,
sequent and not as precedent

as conditions sub-

so as to confer a vested remain-

der, subject to a divestitu-e on the contingency of non-compliance with the condition."
128.

38,

Linton v. Laycock, 33 Oh. st.,

A Freehold
ery of seisin,

coririencing

estate

cannot

at

common law by liv-

be divested under a condition

a resumption of the seisin

by entry;
upon a

though expressly worded that

hence
certain

the condition,
act or event

shall cease or be void, imports only that a right
is given to avoid it;

the estate does not

void under thie condition, but

without

of entry
'ipse facto'

become

voidable only by entry-

Ut

when there can be no entry or possession, tnere being no
livery, the one who may take advantage of tne condition,
must make a claim upon the land before the estate can be revested.
does not

However a condition annexed to a lease for years
require an entry or claim unless so stipulated.

condition avoids the estate

circLlrstances permit it.

annexed and reso far as

A condition like a conditional

in general defeat

estate to which it is annexed;
part

is

of the grantor or lessor

vests the original estate

limitation, must

to which it

A

or determine

tne whole

it cannot avoid t;ie estate in

only and continue it in part.
Express conditions to be performed by the grantor

or lessor precedent to his right to re-enter may supersede
the implied conditions

of the common law and must

be duly

complied with.
A tender of performance on the day and at
will save a condition and if it

the place

is refused, trie land may be

discharged from the lien as in the tender of payment of a
39

mortgage, though the debt may remain as a personal claim.
Kortright

v.

Oady,

21

'.Y.

343.

The time prescribed by the testator may be so inthat

dispensable to the due performance of the condition,
its

non-observance-will

be fatal to the legatee's title.

To

forfeit the estate granted for breach of condition, the
breach must be taken advantage of by some positive act on
the part of the person entitled to the condition;

and herein

consists the great distinction between a condition and a conditional limitation:- in the latter case the estate being
determined on the arrival of the period of limitation without any act,

entry or claim.

"A condition, however, defeats the estate to which
it is annexed only at the election of him who has a right to
enforce it.

its breach, the estate

17otwithstanding

(of a

freehold), can only be defeated by an entry made and until
that is done, it loses none of its original qualities or inWashb. R. P.,

cidents."

I.,
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Non-performance of a condition will be excused by
the default

of the person to whom it

is

to be performed:-

when he is absent at the time his presence in necessary;
where he himself obstructs or prevents performance;

or when

he neglects to do a required first part of the condition.
It is not necessary in order to advantage being

taken of a breach of condition,

that it

any injury to the party whio enters
right

should have caused
Thr

for that breach.

which a conditional grantor of an estate has to regain

the estate upon the breach of the condition is a present
vested interest in the nature of a reversion which he may
at any time convey to his .,rantee upon condition, by release
or he may devise ii. and it

is transmissible to his heirs.

"One who (as heir), has an estate or title real
independently of the deed or instrument

containing

a

condi-

tion of forfeiture, shall not be presumed to have notice of
the condition and he shall not be held to have incurred the
forfeiture unless he committed t-qe breach with the knowledge
of the condition and its consequences." Shackelford v. Hall,
19 Ills. 212.
Where a tenant at will under a verbal lease dependent upon a

condition,

is a tenant at

holls over after a

he

breach t'ereof,

sufferance. Oreech v. ( rockett,5 Oush.

133.

Where there is no ground for the interference of a
court of equity to relieve against a condition, and an estate
is limited defeasible on a breach of tae condition, a recovery will be decreed.

When a grantor is entitled to a rever-

sion of the estate for a condition broken, his right
affected by the fact
right is a legal one.

that

tuie grantee has made

73 Maine 408.

is not

outlays;

his

In ancient tlmes t~ie bel efit of the condition of
re-entry in a lease could belong only to tue landlord and
his heirs;

for the law would not allow of trie transfer of a

mere conditional rigtit

to put an end to tne estate

Even here the landlord acquires no new right

of anotter.

of property,

but merely takes possession of the land under his antecedent
right

of' property.

which gave to the

This is a remnant

of the feudal law,

condition all the force and effect

it had,

to enforce of the vassal strict performance of tne stipulated services to the lord.

Further, the condition must have
subse-

been attached at the time of making the lease and not
quently.

At common law, a condition can be reserved in a
conveyance, only to the grantor or lessor of the estate and
to his heirs and to no other persons.

If a devise be made

by will upon condition, the heir of the testator would be
entitled to enter upon breach of the condition.
tion was not

assignable at

A condi-

common law, but by a recent act

of Parliament,(S and 9 "ictoria,c.106,s.6),

"a right

of enThis

try, vested or contingent, may be disposed of by deed."

in

does not seem to be true in this country, -at least not
'Tew York, for the right to take advantage of a condition

cannot be conveyed so as to give the assignee a right to en,force it,

but

the conveyance will be so far eefective that

it will destroy the right of the grantor to enforce it,
42

thus

Pt'actically destroying the condition. Underhill v. R.R.Co.,

Still v. Trus-

20 Barb. 455; Ludlow v. R.R.Co., 12 id. 440;
46 id. 109;

tees,etc.,

Parsons v. Millei',

15 Wend. 561;

Mich-

ols v. R.R.Co., 12 N.Y. 121; Towle v. Remsen, 70id. 603.
Tnt-it

thre grantors

carried to Ihe extent thiat usually all

*

or their heirs, must

join in the action to recover premises

conveyed upon a conition subsequent,

after a breach of trie

Cook v. Wardens,etc., 67 N.Y. 594. An entry by

condition.

a stranger on behalf of a person entitled

to enter is good

authority it' assented to afterwards

without

Likewise,

by sttch person.
of the con-

a stranger may compel any enforcement

dition where he has purchased real estate on the faith that
Thus the grantee of one

the conditions will be performed.

parcel of a tract of lani sold on certain conditions to several and various persons,
force against
ance of the

the'grantee

t

e right to enter

VanAuker, 34

to tne parties

and

court

of equity en-

of another such parcel,
Ives v.

conditions.

"With respect

may tihrough a

Barb.

tie

observ-

5(6.

to exercise

entitlet

defeat tmie estate of him who holdIs

upon condition, there seems to be a difference between conditions in law and in deed;

if there be a breach of the con-

-ition in law, the lessor or his heirs,
his assignee,

-is estate,
enter;

but

if

the latter,

or if

he

ma,, avail himself of the

mas aliened
right to

no one but him who creates the

estate, or his heirs, can take advantage by entering and des t roying the estate."

II.

Washb.

re-entry reserved to a grantor or lessor,
executors,&c.,

son of the -rantor or lessor,
not take advantage of it,
v.

Sage,

46 Barb.

So upon the

construction given above a condition of

princilles of strict

extensiont to heirs,

1l.

Real Pro..

109,

is

without ary express

restricted to tfie per-

and thie huir or executor can-

To the contra-ry however is

supraf

need not be expressly named in

where it

is

Fonda

said that the heir

the instrument

creating the

condition to entitle him to take advantage of a breach tnereof, occurring either in the lifetime of the grantor or after
his death.

Continuing, tne opinion of the court says that,

to have any effect on the estate, the condition must be. taken
advantage of by those to whom the right so to do belongs;
and it may be stated as a general rule that

with the breach

of a condition a stranger has nothing to do, and a court
will not examine at his request, or in a collateral proceeding, the question whetner a condition has been broken and a
forfeiture incurred.
The statement is often made that when the will
specifies no particular lime for pei'formance, the donee shall
have his whole lifetime.

Schouleron Wills, sect. 600.,

says

this "is too broad and means no more, properly understood,
than to pledge a court of equity to favor one against thie
harsh operation of conditions, especially of conditions pre-

cedent,

as generously as the circumstances and a due inter-

pretation of the will may permit, where the testator has left
the point

open."
Where an estate is given eor a certain period,

with a condition that unless the lessee do a certain thing
or pay a certain sum within a time ste, the estate
reduced.-- then if the lessee fails to do that
or pay that
will

certain

certain thing

sum within the time designated,

vest in the lessee only the lesser estate.

218, b.)

shall be

thte law

(Co. Litt,

On the same principle, a legacy on condition of

being claimed by the legatee in a certain time and manner
is forfeited if the legatee die without performing the cond~tion, or even when the legatee was ignorant of the bequest
and of the decease of the testator.

It is too late for

the heirs of a testator devising land upon condition with
a devise over upon a breach of such condition, to take advantage

of the breach by making an entry after

had passed by the limitation

into the hands of the remain-

der-man. Williams v. Angell,7 R.I.
In

tae estate

145.

New York the necessity for a

demand of posses-

sion upon condition has been abrogated by statute and the
sufficient

demand.

Hosford

bring of an ejectment

is

Ballard, 39 N.Y. 147;

Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N.Y. 219.

v.

Wher a person enters for a condition broken, the
estate becomes void ab initio and the person who enters becomes again seized of his original estate and is in the same
and the entry

situation as if he had never conveyed it away;

of the feoffor for condition broken defeats the estate to
which the condition was annexed,
and incidents annexed to that

defeats all

so it

and all

estate

the rights

charges

and in-

cumbrances created by the feoffer during his possession.
This perhaps seems somewhat harsh, but
be otherwise, without

it could not very well

disturbing the whole arrangement and

operation of such estates.
The forfeiture under a condition is waived and
dispensed with if the grantor or lessor, after having knowledge of the grounds of forfeiture, does any act
cally affirming

the continuance

of the estate

unequivo-

or tenancy;

s

such acts of waiver of forfeiture operates as an election
not to avoid the estate which, when once made and duly expressed, cannot be restricted.

But they operate only retro-

spectively, and if the condition be a contingent
sequent

breach will again create a

right

one, a sub-

of re-entry.

So

also where the election is duly made by entry or otherwise
to avoid the estate, or where it becomes

'ipse facto' void

under the condition or limitation, no act of waiver can operate afterwards to revive

or continue

it.

The forfeiture may be waived when the condition
46

has been broken, if the party who has the right to avail

him-

self of the same waives the right which he may do by acts
as well as by an express agreement.
once waived it cannot afterwards

If the forfeiture is

be reclaimed.

Cornwell v.

I sham, 1 Conn. 79.
But a mere silent acquiescence in or parol assent
to, an act which has constituted a breach of an express condition in a deed, would not amount to a waiver of a right
of forfeiture

for such breach.

Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick.284.
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